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The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage
Brian H. Bix*
A same-sex couple seeks state recognition of their relation-
ship;' a couple about to marry but dissatisfied with current di-
vorce law wants to enter a binding agreement preventing either
partner from filing for no-fault divorce;2 another couple about to
marry wants to enter an enforceable agreement waiving one
party's claims to alimony or to certain property, should the mar-
riage end in divorce; 3 and a same-sex cohabiting couple wants to
enter an enforceable agreement protecting each member's indi-
vidual property interests.4 These examples, and many others,
raise the question of the proper extent of public and private or-
dering of marriage, and marriage-like relationships. Such ques-
tions usually turn on the proper role of the state: if, and when, it
should encourage certain forms of relationships by recognition
and benefits, and when it should empower individuals to organ-
ize their own lives (in ways which may vary from the state's "pre-
ferred structures") through enforceable agreements. In this Arti-
cle, I offer a brief overview an4 restatement of this question, fo-
cusing more on the nature of claims about "public ordering" and
"private ordering" than on moral and policy arguments. I hope to
clarify the terms of the debate, with the hope that this analysis
t Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota.
An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Eighteenth Annual The University
of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, "The Public and Private Faces of Family Law," in
October 2003. I am grateful to participants at the Symposium for their comments and
suggestions.
1 See, for example, Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE2d 941 (Mass
2003) (holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the state marriage statute was
contrary to the Massachusetts state constitution).
2 See, for example, American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.08(1) (2002) (referring to such agreements and
suggesting that they should not be enforceable).
3 See Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, § 3, 9C Uniform Laws Annotated 43 (West
2001 & Supp 2003) (discussing the permissible topics for premarital agreements).
4 See, for example, Mike McCurley, Same-Sex Cohabitation Agreements, in Edward
L. Winer & Lewis Becker, eds, Premarital and Marital Contracts 195-215 (ABA 1993).
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might in turn illuminate the moral and policy arguments within
the substantive debates. 5
In recent years, a number of commentators have urged more
private ordering--or, more precisely, greater public recognition
of private ordering-of marriage and marriage-like relation-
ships.6 Discussions of "private ordering" cut across a wide variety
of issues and ideological positions: from wealthy people who want
to protect their wealth from spouses or potential spouses;7 to
same-sex couples who want to have their relationships, or their
connections to a child, given public recognition;8 to (opposite-sex)
couples who want to bind themselves to a higher level of marital
commitment than state marriage and divorce laws permit.9
One can easily become confused while listening to the de-
bates about public and private ordering, due to the variety of fact
situations, and the corresponding ways that ideological views (for
example, traditional, feminist, libertarian, and conservative 10 )
seem to appear on different sides of the debate as one goes from
5 See, for example, Lynn D. Wardle, et al, eds, Marriage and Same-Sex Unions: A
Debate (Praeger 2003) (discussing arguments for and against the legal recognition of
same-sex unions); Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 Ind L J 453, 466, 468, 469 (1998) (discussing the
arguments for and against the legal enforcement of a wide range of premarital agree-
ments, concluding in favor of broad enforcement); American Law Institute, Principles §
7.08 (cited in note 2) (discussing the arguments for and against the legal enforcement of
premarital agreements, concluding that enforcement should be limited regarding both the
scope and substance of such agreements); Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements
and Gender Justice, 6 Yale J L & Feminism 229 (1994) (offering arguments against the
enforcement of premarital agreements regarding post-dissolution financial terms, on the
basis that such agreements disproportionately harm women).
6 Rasmusen and Stake, 73 Ind L J at 464-65 (cited in note 5) (advocating greater
enforcement of premarital agreements on various topics); Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 228-30
(Routledge 1995) (arguing that private contract should replace state regulation of marital
relationships).
7 Rasmusen and Stake, 73 Ind L J at 461 n 40 (cited in note 5); Brod, 6 Yale L J &
Feminism at 243 (cited in note 5) (describing the common situation of a wealthy older
man presenting a premarital agreement to a younger, financially inexperienced woman).
8 Goodridge, 798 NE2d at 949.
9 Rasmusen and Stake, 73 Ind L J at 463 (cited in note 5).
10 For example, one can find both law and economics theorists and feminists arguing
for greater private ordering of marriage and marriage-like relationships. Compare id at
464-65 (advocating greater enforcement of premarital agreements on various topics) with
Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 228-30 (cited in note 6) (arguing that private contract
should replace state regulation of marital relationships); and one can find feminists on
both sides of the debate about the private ordering of marriage and marriage-like rela-
tionships. Compare id (building on the existence of premarital agreements to support a
claim for wholesale contractual governance of marital relationships) with Brod, 6 Yale J L
& Feminism at 240 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the enforcement of premarital agree-
ments increases gender inequality).
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situation to situation, and also due to the amorphous nature of
the terms "public ordering" and "private ordering." If one is going
to discuss the public and private ordering of marriage and mar-
riage-like relationships, then one should begin with some under-
standing of what is meant by "public ordering" and "private or-
dering." Parts I and II offer an overview of what these terms
mean. Part III considers problems with or objections to private
ordering (for example, that private agreements may contravene
the public interest, that negative effects may harm third parties,
and that problems of bounded rationality may arise). Parts IV
and V offer remedies and responses to these problems and objec-
tions, including procedural and substantive constraints that seek
to protect the vulnerable while still maintaining significant party
autonomy.
I. PUBLIC ORDERING
In discussing the private ordering of intimate relationships
and families, much confusion comes from a misunderstanding of
what is included, in this country and at this time, by the idea of a
public ordering. "Public ordering" relates to, but remains distinct
from, the "public interest" in marriage. Public ordering refers to
the governmental regulation of marriage and marriage-like rela-
tionships, while public interest refers to the interest society or
government might have in the marital status of citizens or in
how they organize their intimate lives (for example, some believe
that society is better off when a larger percentage of its citizens
are married, or when most children are raised by married par-
ents)."
"Public ordering" of marriage in this country, in the sense of
direct governmental regulation, is in some ways quite modest-
sometimes paradoxically so. Excepting prohibitions on same-sex,
polygamous, and incestuous marriages, those who meet the
minimum age and competence requirements face only minor le-
gal barriers to entry into marriage-usually modest licensing or
ceremonial formalities. 12 Even within marriage, courts have re-
11 For a general discussion on this subject, see Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The
States' Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U Miami L Rev 1 (2000). Views
about the connection between marriage and the public interest underlie recent proposals
for government promotion of marriage. See, for example, Robert Pear and David D.
Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of Marriage, NY Times Al (Jan
14, 2004).
12 See, for example, Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 35-84
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mained reluctant, under the doctrine of "marital privacy," to en-
force duties of mutual support imposed by statute or common
law.13
People can easily circumvent the little regulation of entry
into marriage that does exist (almost all of it occurs at the state
level). 14 For example, under traditional choice of law rules, a per-
son could marry in one state with the general expectation that
the marriage would be recognized as valid in any other state;15
thus, avoiding some' 6 state policies codified in the marriage-
entry rules of that individual's home state. A person can even
obtain a divorce in a jurisdiction different from where he or she
(Chicago 1989) (summarizing modern U.S. marriage law and comparing it with the rules
in Western Europe).
13 The standard citation for this (non-constitutional) doctrine of "family privacy" is
McGuire v McGuire, 59 NW2d 336 (Neb 1953), where the court refused to order the hus-
band to give greater support to his wife in an intact marriage. See, for example, Ira Mark
Ellman, et al, Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 130-35 (LexisNexis 3d ed 1998) (using
McGuire as the case grounding a discussion of family privacy). There are rare cases that
allow an award of maintenance despite the continuing existence of an intact marriage, for
example, Coltea v Coltea, 856 So2d 1047 (Fla App 2003), but these cases are highly excep-
tional. Courts have occasionally invoked the marital duty to invalidate agreements pur-
porting to modify them. See, for example, Borelli v Brusseau, 16 Cal Rptr 2d 16 (Cal App
1993). Borelli is discussed in greater detail in notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
It appears that matters were different some centuries back when the ecclesiastical
courts regulated English marriage law. See R. H. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Me-
dieval England 67 (Cambridge 1974) (discussing specific enforcement of marriage con-
tracts, including orders "that the defendant accept the plaintiff as his legitimate spouse
and treat her with marital affection"); R. H. Helmholz, Canonical Remedies in Medieval
Marriage Law: The Contributions of Legal Practice, 1 St Thomas L Rev 647, 651 (2003)
(describing the willingness of the medieval church courts to order "specific performance"
of matrimonial contracts).
14 Though other aspects of public ordering are not so easily circumvented, as those
who want to have a same-sex union celebrated or recognized have learned. See Rosengar-
ten v Downes, 802 A2d 170, 178 (Conn App 2002) (holding that the dissolution of a Ver-
mont civil union was not within the court's subject matter jurisdiction because of "strong
legislative policy" against same-sex marriages); Burns v Burns, 560 SE2d 47, 48-49 (Ga
App 2002), cert denied 2003 Ga LEXIS 626 (refusing to view a Vermont civil union as a
'marriage" for the purpose of interpreting a consent decree visitation clause); Fred A.
Bernstein, Gay Unions Were Only Half the Battle, NY Times 9-2 (Apr 6, 2003) (reporting
that a Texas court refused to grant a divorce to a Vermont civil union; the Vermont civil
union statute requires those seeking the dissolution of a civil union within Vermont to
have been resident in that state for one year). But see Elissa Gootman, Judge Allows Suit
in Death of Gay Mate, NY Times D8 (Apr 16, 2003) (describing a Long Island, New York,
case in which a civil union partner was allowed to file a wrongful death lawsuit as a
spouse).
15 See, for example, Eugene F. Scoles, et al, Conflict of Laws § 13.5 at 548-51 (West
3d ed 2000). This is subject to limited exceptions based on "public policy" and, in a hand-
ful of states, "marriage evasion legislation." Id at 551-65.
16 There are some limits, in some states, on the ability to circumvent state laws and
policies. See id (discussing marriage-evasion rules and public policy grounds supporting
them).
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was married or where he or she lived during the marriage, 17 and
the jurisdiction hearing the divorce generally applies its own
laws, even if that state had little prior connection to the couple or
the marriage.' 8 The resulting divorce judgment is enforceable in
all other jurisdictions. 19
Despite minimal regulation of the formation and dissolution
of the marriage relationship, the status of marriage has great
significance under many federal laws, 20 state laws,21 and private
contractual provisions (for example, in insurance policies and
employment agreements),22 such that spouses have rights that
non-spouses do not have.23 Given the right of individuals to
structure their own lives outside of marriage, and their signifi-
cant freedom to structure their lives even within marriage, why
does the government wish to constrain individuals' ability to
structure their marital lives even to the limited extent that the
current laws do?
One argument for public ordering of marriage is that it
maintains uniformity. 24 First, uniformity could reflect a judg-
ment that a certain package of rights, benefits, and obligations
will work best for most couples, even if not for everyone. Even if
this assumption is true, it would support, at most, the creation of
17 Though this may require establishing domicile in the forum state. See Bell v Bell,
181 US 175 (1901) (invalidating a divorce decree based on lack of jurisdiction by the
granting court, where neither party had established a domicile in the forum state).
11 See Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 15.4 at 609 (cited in note 15).
19 See Williams v North Carolina, 317 US 287, 301 (1942) (holding that full faith and
credit applies to divorce decrees); The Full Faith and Credit Clause, US Const, art IV, § 1.
20 The standard reference is to there being over one thousand federal laws which
recognize status, rights, or benefits that turn on whether one is married or not. Nancy F.
Cott, Public Vows 2, 231 n 3 (Harvard 2000) (citing a 1996 Report of the U.S. General
Accounting Office).
21 Along with numerous state law rights and benefits analogous to the federal rules
discussed in note 20, state laws relating to marital status prominently include, in nearly
every state, the right of spouses to a certain share of their partner's estate upon death,
regardless of the deceased partner's wishes. Eugene F. Scoles and Edward C. Halbach,
Jr., Problems and Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts 92 (Little, Brown 5th ed
1993).
22 See, for example, Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Who is a "Spouse" Within Clause of
Automobile Liability, Uninsured Motorist, or No-Fault Insurance Policy Defining Addi-
tional Insured, 36 ALR4th 588 (1985) (listing cases).
23 See Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44, 59 (Haw 1993) (listing benefits accruing to married
couples in Hawaii).
24 In a federal system, the question of uniformity has its own complications: the fact
that family law is primarily a matter of state law invites a certain lack of uniformity from
state to state, but the Full Faith and Credit clause, US Const Art IV, § 1, and other con-
stitutional constraints limit the extent of diversity and difference within the country.
Some of these tensions are discussed in Bix, 55 U Miami L Rev at 15-26 (cited in note 11).
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a default rule-as in commercial transactions and corporate gov-
ernance 25-that operates only if the parties do not expressly
choose a different rule, thus allowing them to "opt out" if they so
desire.
Second, perhaps a rigid uniform rule, rather than a default
rule, helps garner social support for any particular formulation
of marriage. 26 If friends, acquaintances, and the general public
are to enforce legal rules (and social norms) governing marriages,
it is easiest if those rules and norms remain constant across
marriages. 27 If the standards vary, then society cannot as effec-
tively enforce those norms, absent a low-cost way to inform peo-
ple which set of rules apply to which marriages. However, if the
state imposes relatively few standards for marriage, and enforces
only a fraction of those standards, thus allowing citizens gener-
ally to act as they wish within marriage, 28 how much of a claim
can the state have for "clear signals" 29 about marital status? 30
There are certain forms of private ordering of intimate rela-
tionships where the state does not prohibit the private ordering
through criminal or civil laws, but rather the state refuses to
25 On the possible analogy between marriage rules and Uniform Commercial Code
default rules, see note 96 and accompanying text.
26 See Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in F.H. Buckley, ed, The Fall
and Rise of Freedom of Contract 256, 270 (Duke 1999) (arguing that "restrictions on free-
dom of marital contract" facilitate "community enforcement").
27 As Professor Mary Anne Case has pointed out (in conversation), it may not be easy
to ascertain someone's marital status if he or she chooses not to disclose or to mislead on
the subject (for example by wearing a wedding ring even though not married, or not wear-
ing one even though married).
28 There are certain limited exceptions. For example, while a married couple might
privately agree to have an "open marriage," one that condones extramarital affairs,
should one partner later change his or her mind, the earlier informal agreement might
not be a defense for a claim of adultery. See Hanger v Hanger, Civ No D1382-74 (DC
Super Ct 1974), excerpted in Judith Areen, Family Law: Cases and Materials 382 (Foun-
dation 4th ed 1999) (holding that a separation agreement clause that the parties would
live separate and apart with the right to conduct themselves as if sole and unmarried
does not prevent one spouse from suing for divorce on the grounds of adultery). In some
states, claims of adultery can not only ground a claim for divorce, but can also affect fi-
nancial provisions and (albeit rarely) child custody provisions. See Ellman, Family Law
423-36, 635-36 (cited in note 13) (discussing the role of adultery in property division,
alimony, and custody decisions).
29 "Signaling" is a way of displaying through actions one's abilities or inclinations
(where "talk is cheap"). For a discussion of signaling and its importance for legal and
social norms, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard 2000).
30 One might contrast a religious community that had strict norms regarding behav-
ior within marriage and its own extra-legal sanctions (for example, shunning). Within
such a community, it would be crucial to know who was married and who was not because
of the strict standards of behavior that varied according to one's marital status and the
strong consequences for violation of the norms.
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recognize the relationship in any formal way. Such private order-
ing without public recognition includes polyamorous households
(in all jurisdictions),3 1 same-sex unions, and long-term opposite-
sex non-marital unions (in most jurisdictions).32 One standard
explanation for the lack of public recognition is that by refusing
to recognize some sorts of unions, the state encourages couples to
enter marriage.3 3 This argument obviously has greater force with
opposite-sex couples who could get married under state law than
same-sex couples and polyamorous groups who could not. The
usual effect of not recognizing same-sex unions, for example, is
simply to harm any children being raised by the couple, and per-
haps also to undermine whatever other benefit might accrue to
society by having people in long-term committed relationships.34
Alternatively, lack of recognition may sometimes reflect a
judgment that certain relationships are harmful, either to the
parties involved, to society generally, or to both. Thus, both fam-
ily law and contract law refuse to recognize agreements that re-
flect a "meretricious relationship" (payment of money for sexual
services); in this sense the older family law (and contract law)
did not distinguish between prostitution, extramarital affairs,
31 No American jurisdiction recognizes polygamous unions as a legal category. See
<httpJ/usmarriagelaws.com/searchlunited-statespolygamy/index.shtml> (visited Febru-
ary 5, 2004) (reviewing state laws regarding polygamy). If the polyamorous partners try
to make their group relationship legal, they will come up against rules criminalizing, or
at least prohibiting, attempts at bigamy and polygamy. See, for example, Richard A.
Posner and Katharine B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws 143-54 (Chicago 1996).
As regards the toleration of "private" polyamory, while a number of states criminalize
extramarital sex, these statutes are rarely enforced. In modem America, polyamorous
groups are more likely to come into trouble from zoning laws than from fornication stat-
utes. See, for example, Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 NYU Rev L & Soc Change (forthcoming 2004) [on file with U
Chi Legal F] (reviewing the bigamy, polygamy, and zoning laws polyamorous groups
face).
32 On the limited rights of nonmarital cohabitants, see, for example, Ellman, Family
Law 932-96 (cited in note 13); see also Fitzsimmons v Mini Coach of Boston, 799 NE2d
1256 (Mass 2003) (refusing to extend spousal consortium rights to long-term cohabitants
on the basis that the state has an interest in restricting certain rights and benefits to
married couples); Boland v Catalano, 521 A2d 142, 145 (Conn 1987) ("The rights and
obligations that attend a valid marriage simply do not arise where the parties choose to
cohabit outside the marital relationship .... Ordinary contract principles are not sus-
pended, however, for unmarried persons living together, whether or not they engage in
sexual activity.")
33 See, for example, Hewitt v Hewitt, 394 NE2d 1204, 1207-11 (Ill 1979) (arguing that
recognizing property claims arising from a nonmarital cohabitation relationship would
undermine the strong public policy in favor of marriage).
34 See, for example, James Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem 7-18 (HarperCollins
2002) (arguing that strong marriages and families have significant benefits both for indi-
viduals and for society generally).
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and nonmarital cohabitation. 35 The implied policy argument was
that all three practices, by undermining traditional marriage,
contradicted the public interest.36 Some commentators have tried
to argue that recognition of same-sex couples would similarly
cause general harm to society.37
A different sort of argument has been offered 38 as regards po-
lygamous marriages: that even if such marriages are not im-
moral, they create administrative difficulties (that certain rights
and benefits are easier to administer when there is only one
other marital partner) that the state can reasonably choose to
avoid.
In summary, there is a sense in which the government (at
least in the United States, and probably in many other countries)
does not so much "order" or "regulate" marriage, as "privilege" it
and "subsidize" it. 39 Like the criminal prohibition on some forms
of intimate relationship and the public "recognition" of other
forms of intimate relationships, government subsidy of some re-
lationships (often connected with recognition, but the two actions
can be separated) frequently has the purpose or effect of affecting
private choices in intimate matters.
At one time, divorce rules helped to enforce state norms
about appropriate marital behavior: only innocent and victimized
spouses had a right to obtain a divorce, 40 and "guilty" spouses
35 See, for example, Taylor v Fields, 178 Cal App 3d 653 (1986) (refusing to enforce an
oral contract between a man and his mistress because it rested on "meretricious" consid-
eration). Washington State, in the course of recognizing limited property rights arising
out of a long-term nonmarital cohabitation, has ironically labeled the status "meretricious
relationship," thus making it the one state where rights arise from asserting that one was
in such a relationship, rather than by denying it. For a general discussion of Washington
State's doctrine and recent caselaw applying it, see Amanda J. Beane, Note, One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back: Vasquez v Hawthorne Wrongly Denied Washington's Meretri-
cious Relationship Doctrine to Same-Sex Couples, 76 Wash L Rev 475 (2001).
36 See Hewitt, 394 NE2d at 1207-08 (arguing that recognizing property claims arising
from a nonmarital cohabitation relationship would undermine the strong public policy in
favor of marriage).
37 See, for example, Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some Poten-
tial Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 Widener J Pub L 401 (2002) (arguing that
recognizing same-sex unions will create significant systemic harms).
38 I have heard it from Professor Mary Anne Case, in private conversation.
39 See Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 228-30 (cited in note 6) (discussing the way
that current law privileges traditional marriage over other forms of intimate relation-
ship). Whether subsidies should be considered a public "ordering" of such relationships is
a question about word usage that need not detain us.
40 See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 204-08 (Simon & Schuster
2nd ed 1985) (summarizing the history of divorce law before no-fault divorce).
[2004:
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suffered financial penalties upon divorce.41 For instance, wives
guilty of adultery were sometimes forbidden by statute from re-
ceiving alimony,42 at a time when the rules of coverture 43 during
marriage and property division at divorce excluded most wives
from leaving marriage with anything financially beyond their
rights to alimony." Given the current prevalence of no-fault di-
vorce statutes, however, contemporary divorce rules rarely en-
force state norms of marital behavior.45
Much of the actual "regulation" of marriage could be said to
occur more informally, through "social norms."46 Social norms
can be seen as an intermediate between public and private order-
ing; however, they are, in an important sense, a substitute for
public regulation. They are "public" in the sense that they reflect
community standards rather than the preferences of the indi-
viduals most directly involved.47
II. PRIVATE ORDERING
"Private ordering" is a deceptively complex concept. At one
level, references to the private ordering of relationships resonate
with a type of privacy, with the way that individuals (especially
after Lawrence v Texas48 ) can structure their personal and social
41 Two states, Georgia, Ga Code Ann § 19-6-1(b) (Lexis 1999 & Supp 2003), and
North Carolina, NC Gen Stat Ann § 50-16.3A (Lexis 2001), continue to forbid adulterous
spouses of either gender from receiving alimony. South Carolina, SC Code Ann § 20-3-130
(Law Co-op 1976 & Supp 2002), prohibits alimony awards to spouses who commit adul-
tery before the "signing of a written property or marital settlement agreement" or before
a court "order approving a property or marital settlement agreement." Additionally, in
Virginia, Va Code § 20-107.1(B) (Supp 2003), adultery is a bar to alimony in all but excep-
tional cases.
42 Chester G. Vernier and John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony
Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 Law & Contemp Probs 197, 202 (1939).
43 The rules of coverture usually included a wife's disability to own property or enter
contracts in her own name, with the husband owning any property she brought to the
marriage and having the right to enter agreements for her. See Cott, Public Vows 11-12
(cited in note 20) (discussing coverture).
44 Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract 44 (The Free Press 1981).
45 Even in contemporary divorce law, judgments of marital fault can play a limited
role in the financial and custody judgments arising from divorce, see, for example, Ell-
man, Family Law 423-26, 632-38 (cited in note 13), but these remain more the exception
than the rule.
46 Posner, Family Law and Social Norms at 256-74 (cited in note 26).
47 There are often good policy or efficiency reasons why the government might prefer
to delegate regulation to social norms rather than trying to do so through the law. Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U Chi L Rev 133 (1996).
48 123 SCt 2472 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sod-
omy violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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lives as they wish without interference from the government, and
with a certain level of minimal state protection against coercive
interference by other citizens.49 Another sense of private ordering
involves having the power to order one's life by being able to en-
ter binding agreements for the future distribution of property
(for example, through wills). 50 This form of private ordering re-
quires a government (or social institution or other social force)
willing and able to enforce the commitments entered into. This
form of private ordering could also be understood as a willing-
ness to bind a later self to the preferences and plans of an earlier
self. A contract stating that, at some future date, X will provide a
service to Y at a given price, holds X and Y to those terms even if
at a later date, one of those parties (the "later selves" of X or Y)
no longer wants that exchange. While talk of "past selves" and
"future selves" seems gimmicky, it may provide a different per-
spective on certain aspects of public and private ordering. The
move from the historical no-divorce ("no exit") or fault divorce
("difficult exit") legal rules to those of no-fault divorce ("[rela-
tively] easy exit"51) could be re-characterized in terms of moving
away from protecting the preferences of earlier selves (who make
the commitment of marriage) and moving toward the preferences
of later selves (who want to get out of the commitment).52
Under a more conventional characterization, where we do
not separate the identity of "past selves," "present selves," and
"future selves," the ability to enter legally binding agreements
and commitments has important welfare implications. In com-
mercial agreements, one party's willingness to expend money on
a project will reasonably turn on whether its commercial part-
ners will be forced either to complete the transaction or to pay
compensation for those expenses-and perhaps for lost profits as
well. 53
49 Id.
50 See, for example, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 27-28 (Oxford 2d ed 1994) (dis-
cussing "power-conferring rules").
51 I do not mean to discount the pain and expense that can accompany nearly all
divorces, even those brought under no-fault provisions and where no terms of the divorce
are seriously contested.
52 I realize, of course, that matters are much more complicated. Depending on the
structure of the fault and no-fault systems, the move can also be seen as from a fully
consensual system (no marriage or exit from marriage without the consent of both par-
ties) to a unilateral system (where exit from marriage is allowed on the choice of one
spouse, even when the other objects).
53 This can be understood as compensation for the alternative profitable projects one
did not and could not enter when one committed to doing this one. See, for example, Lon
[2004:304
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Similarly, one's willingness to enter a marital or quasi-
marital connection with another person, and to make certain
sacrifices-regarding one's career, for instance-for the sake of
that other person or for the sake of the household, may depend
on the extent to which society or government will hold the other
party to carrying through with the joint (marital) project, 54 or at
least force the other person to make compensatory payments
should he or she choose to abandon the commitment.
For same-sex cohabiting couples that are not allowed to
marry, but who want their private arrangements enforced, 55 this
becomes an especially important issue. In particular, same-sex
couples considering raising children face significant problems. 56
In such circumstances, only one partner can be the biological
parent of the child, and typically only one of the partners can be
the legal parent of the child.5 7 A number of states allow the sec-
ond partner to adopt the child, thus making both partners legal
parents of the child,58 but many states have not accepted this
option.59 It is reasonable for a partner not to want to raise a child
without assurance that his or her legal rights to the child will be
protected. For that reason, many same-sex couples who wish to
L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: Part 1,
46 Yale L J 52, 60-62 (1936) (arguing that expectation damages can be justified as a way
of recovering hard-to-prove reliance damages).
54 In thinking about the limits of such ideas, one can look at the suggestion made in
Chile, where divorce was until recently unavailable, and legislators were considering
proposals for introducing divorce. One commentator had suggested that couples should
have the possibility of marrying with a "no divorce" option if they so choose. Larry Rohter,
Chile Inches Toward a Law That Would Make Divorce Legal, NY Times A4 (Sept 29,
2003).
55 Even when the couple enters express, detailed written agreements regarding fi-
nancial matters, where there can be no doubt about the parties' intention that the agree-
ment be legally enforceable, states vary to the extent that they are willing to enforce the
agreements. Among the decisions upholding the enforceability of such arrangements
among same-sex couples are Whorton v Dillingham, 248 Cal Rptr 405 (Cal App 1988),
Posik v Layton, 695 So2d 759 (Fla App 1997), Crooke v Gilden, 414 SE2d 645 (Ga 1992),
and Silver v Starrett, 674 NYS2d 915 (NY Sup 1998).
56 For a general discussion, see Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family
Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 Cardozo L Rev 1299 (1997) (discussing
the private and public ordering of gay and lesbian couples and families). See also
McCurley, Same-Sex Cohabitation at 195-215 (cited in note 4) (making drafting sugges-
tions for such agreements).
57 See Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children,
18 J Am Acad Matrimonial L 95, 109 (2002).
58 Id at 109 n 52 (citing cases).
59 See, for example, Matter of Adoption of T K J, 931 P2d 488 (Colo App 1996) (inter-
preting a Colorado statute to preclude second-parent adoption); In re Adoption of Jane
Doe, 719 NE2d 1071 (Ohio App 1998) (interpreting an Ohio statute as inconsistent with
second-parent adoption).
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raise a child together have entered express written co-parenting
agreements, by which each partner agrees to recognize the other
partner's parental rights should the relationship later break
down. However, a number of the states that have faced the ques-
tion have refused to recognize co-parenting agreements in such
contexts. 6
0
Much of the academic discussion of private ordering of mar-
riage involves agreements in which the parties attempt to alter
the statutory terms of marriage (for example, the available
grounds for divorce, the rules of property ownership during the
marriage, and the rules of property division and alimony upon
divorce). Why would couples want to enter such agreements? 61
One reason would be to seek a greater level of commitment than
is possible under the state's divorce rules (which, for most states,
amounts to allowing unilateral no-fault divorce 62). This may sim-
ply reflect the parties' commitment to each other or their ideas
about marriage; or, it may be a means one party uses to try to
protect his or her current and future sacrifices in the marriage.
Parties may also enter marriage agreements to ensure par-
ticular financial terms, usually favoring the party initiating the
negotiations, upon divorce.63 For example, a spouse might seek to
60 See, for example, In re Interest of Z J H, 471 NW2d 202 (Wis 1991) (refusing to
enforce co-parenting agreement on the grounds that it violated public policy); In the Mat-
ter of Alison D v Virginia M, 572 NE2d 27 (NY 1991) (holding that a co-parent did not
have standing to seek visitation with child despite the fact that the co-parents "planned
for the conception and birth of the child and agreed to share jointly all rights and respon-
sibilities of child-rearing"); Curiale v Reagan, 272 Cal Rptr 520, 521 (Cal App 1990) (hold-
ing that co-parent who was not "natural mother, step-mother, nor adoptive mother" does
not have standing to seek custody and visitation with child); Nancy S v Michele G, 279
Cal Rptr 212, 216 (Cal App 1991) (holding that a de facto parent does not have the "same
rights as a parent to seek custody and visitation over the objection of the children's natu-
ral mother"). The effect of Z J H in Wisconsin was largely undermined by a later case
recognizing a lesbian co-parent's rights, though the decision was not grounded primarily
on that couple's contract. In re H S H-K, 533 NW2d 419 (Wis 1995) (holding that co-
parent could seek visitation with child because of her parent-like relationship with the
child).
61 In asking this question, one must keep in mind the relative ignorance of parties
regarding the terms that will be applied. See Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage
Contract, 23 U Mich J L Ref217, 234-37 (1990) (discussing the relative ignorance of most
people regarding the rules of marriage and divorce). This ignorance reflects both the fact
that most people enter marriage with only a limited-and usually erroneous-idea of
what the rules of marriage and divorce are in their state; and the fact that the current
rules in their state may not be applied, either because the state changes the rules, the
parties move to another state during the marriage, or one of the parties moves after sepa-
ration and seeks a divorce in another state.
62 Ira Mark Ellman and Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1999 U Ill L Rev 719.
63 Another reason for entering agreements is that such agreements might be required
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limit his or her partner's alimony claims, or determine in ad-
vance the property that each partner will receive upon divorce.64
Many of the premarital agreements litigated in reported cases or
discussed in articles involve the arguably unsavory situation of a
richer partner seeking to protect his or her wealth by asking the
poorer partner to waive his or her rights to property or alimony.65
Occasionally, one comes across the more sympathetic set of facts
where the premarital agreement sought to protect the interests
of children born from a prior marriage, or to keep a family busi-
ness or family heirlooms within the family.66
There are other complex interactions of "public ordering"
and "private ordering": for example, the negotiations that occur
when partners decide whether and when to enter or leave the
marriage and how to divide tasks within the marriage occur in
the context of the alternatives set by society and social norms on
one hand, and legal rules on the other.67 Thus, whether a spouse
can end the marriage without the consent of the other spouse,
and what terms of property division and alimony the state sanc-
tions upon termination, have obvious effects on the bargaining
or encouraged by one's religion or by community tradition. There is some caselaw regard-
ing the enforcement of Jewish and Islamic premarital agreements. See Michelle Green-
berg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements, 32 Colum J L & Soc
Prob 359 (1999) (discussing court treatment of the Jewish Ketubahs); Ghada G. Qaisi,
Note, Religious Marriage Contracts: Judicial Enforcement of Mahr Agreements in Ameri-
can Courts, 15 J L & Relig 67 (2000); Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Con-
tracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect
on Muslim Women, 76 S Cal L Rev 189 (2002). These agreements raise special complexi-
ties, in part because of the constitutional requirement of separation of church and state
(which may make enforcement, or specific enforcement, of such agreements problematic),
and in part because the terms of such agreements tend to be non-negotiable and they may
not reflect the parties' specific preferences (these last two factors are also potential argu-
ments for being less willing to enforce religious premarital agreements as opposed to
other premarital agreements).
64 See, for example, In re Marriage of Bonds, 99 Cal Rptr 2d 252, 254 n 1 (Cal 2000)
(upholding a premarital agreement in which a wealthy baseball player and his far-less-
wealthy fiancde both waived their community property rights, agreeing to treat property
each acquired during the marriage as separate property not subject to division at di-
vorce).
65 Id. See Brod, 6 Yale J L & Feminism at 234-40 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the
"purpose and effect" of most premarital agreements is to protect the earnings of the "eco-
nomically superior" spouse).
66 See, for example, Goodwin v Goodwin, 592 So2d 212, 213 (Ala 1991) (premarital
agreement preserving homestead for children from a prior marriage); Simeone v Simeone,
581 A2d 162, 170 (Pa 1990) (McDermott dissenting) (noting that a premarital agreement
may properly protect an heirloom).
67 See Amy Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 Va L Rev 509, 565-75 (1998) (discussing the effects of social
norms, legal rules, and social and economic realities on bargaining between couples).
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power of spouses where divorce is a possible threat or an alterna-
tive to a bargained solution.68
One complication in the policy discussions regarding when
and whether private (re-)ordering of marriage should be legally
enforced is that most parties enter marriage ignorant of the fi-
nancial terms and other legal rights and duties of marriage, and
usually remain so unless and until they face legal separation or
divorce.69 though this may raise more questions about the en-
forcement of the "default rules" than it does about agreements
altering those rules.70
III. PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATE ORDERING
The general argument for making enforceable the private
ordering of marriage and marriage-like relationships reflects the
general ideals underlying other forms of private ordering (e.g.,
contracts, trusts, property, and wills): that it better serves both
private and public interests to allow parties to order their lives
as it suits them.71 Michael Trebilcock and Steven Elliott have
effectively summarized some of the difficulties in applying this
general view to the area of contracts within intimate relation-
ships.7 2 As they point out, parties entering financial agreements
with family members are less likely than non-family members to
be motivated by their own interests, and less able to protect
those interests, because of the greater likelihood in the family
68 Thus, if a husband can end a marriage without his wife's consent and the likely
terms of the divorce would leave the wife with little property and little or no alimony (and
if one adds that she may have sacrificed her career to raise children during the marriage,
leaving her with few marketable skills), then the husband's threat to leave could give him
coercive pressure, allowing him to "persuade" his wife to sign an agreement with one-
sided terms in his favor.
69 See Baker, 23 U Mich J L Ref at 234-37 (cited in note 61) (discussing the relative
ignorance of most people regarding the rules of marriage and divorce).
70 If parties entering marriage are unaware of the terms of marriage, then there is a
strong argument that they have not given their knowing consent to those terms. How-
ever, parties entering marriage are nonetheless bound to those terms. This contrasts with
the rules of premarital agreements, where the law seems to be moving towards a re-
quirement that the parties be informed in clear language of the rights being altered by
the agreement. See American Law Institute, Principles § 7.04(3)(c)(i) (cited in note 2)
(stating that it is a criterion of informed consent to a premarital agreement that if a party
is not represented by counsel the agreement must explain in clear language the nature of
the rights altered by the agreement).
71 Michael J. Trebilcock and Steven Elliott, The Scope and Limits of Legal Paternal-
ism: Altruism and Coercion in Family Financial Arrangements, in Peter Benson, ed, The
Theory of Contract Law: New Essays 45, 47-48 (Cambridge 2001).
72 See id at 45-85.
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context of altruism and coercion.73 The way interests intersect in
a family (for example, that one's own happiness is frequently a
function of how happy a spouse or child is), and the subtle forms
of coercion and domination attached to the often-intricate dy-
namics of intimacy and interdependence, may make us doubt
that enforcing family agreements advances individual welfare as
frequently or as clearly as it does with commercial agreements
between non-family members. However, to raise doubts differs
from concluding that such agreements should not be enforced.
Indeed, there are possible safeguards that, if imposed, might
make enforcement more desirable, as discussed in Part IV.
Why do courts refuse to enforce agreements ordering mar-
riage and marriage-like relationships? The protection of third
parties is a standard justification for non-enforcement of certain
agreements,74 and the protection of children is a standard, and
important, concern in marriage and family agreements. 75 Nota-
bly, courts refuse to enforce terms of premarital agreements in-
volving child custody. 76 Also, in separation agreements entered
into at the end of marriage, courts generally give no special def-
erence to terms regarding child custody and child support, and
courts have a duty to review those terms to make sure that they
protect the best interests of the children.7 7 Similarly, if it were
shown that certain kinds of premarital agreements would likely
lead to marriages which create harmful environments for raising
children, or that certain post-divorce arrangements make it diffi-
cult to raise children, then there would be good reasons not to
enforce or encourage those sorts of agreements, despite the de-
sires of the contracting parties.
Another standard argument for non-enforcement is that
agreements of this sort tend to arise in an area where we may
have an inadequate ability to protect our own interests, in part
because of the well-documented cognitive limitations on our abil-
73 See id at 49-54.
74 See Edwardson v Edwardson, 798 SW2d 941, 946 (Ky 1990) (noting that that
"[q]uestions of child support, child custody and visitation are not subject to [premarital]
agreements").
75 See, for example, Goodwin, 592 So2d at 213 (addressing a premarital agreement
intending to protect children of former marriage).
76 Edwardson, 798 SW2d at 946 (noting that that "[qluestions of child support, child
custody and visitation are not subject to [premarital] agreements").
77 See, for example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 306, 9A Part I Uniform
Laws Annotated 248-49 (West 1998 & Supp 2003) (authorizing different levels of scrutiny
for provisions of separation agreements involving property and those relating to children).
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ity to evaluate alternatives-limitations sometimes summarized
as "bounded rationality. 78 One such limitation may stem from
an inevitable optimism at the beginning of a relationship: when
two people are deeply committed to one another, it may be hard
to take seriously the possibility that the relationship could turn
out badly, and thus one or both of the parties might fail to con-
sider how financial or other provisions should be ordered in such
a circumstance.7 9
Few, if any, commentators have argued for unlimited state
enforcement of private ordering of marriage.80 For example, the
doctrine of "marital privacy"8' is usually cited as the basis for not
enforcing agreements between spouses regarding aspects of their
daily interaction (for example, who will clean the house or pick
up the kids; how the spouses will speak to one another; and the
details of the couple's sexual lives). While some have argued that
it might be valuable to the individuals themselves to work out the
details of their life together in a written agreement,8 2 agreements
regarding the mundane and intimate interactions within a mar-
riage have never been enforceable, and it is hard to find anyone
who argues that legal enforcement of such agreements would be
either practical or valuable.
Even in areas where we believe that agreements should be
presumptively enforceable-commercial transactions, for in-
stance-there are usually boundaries beyond which bargaining
strategies or substantive terms will be considered inappropriate
and unenforceable. In contract law, these terms fall under doc-
trines like "duress," "undue influence," "misrepresentation," and
78 On "bounded rationality" generally, see Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos
Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge 1982)
(summarizing, through a series of articles, social science work documenting these cogni-
tive limitations). On the application of bounded rationality to premarital agreements, see
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan L
Rev 211, 254-58 (1995) (discussing how the limits of cognition justify the courts' approach
to premarital agreements); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforce-
ment of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 Wm & Mary L
Rev 145, 193-200 (1998) (discussing how bounded rationality might justify some limits on
the enforcement of premarital agreements).
79 Id.
80 For example, while Rasmusen and Stake conclude that the government should
allow greater private ordering in marriage, they also argue that individuals should not
have as much freedom of contract as in the commercial context. Rasmusen and Stake, 73
Ind L J at 499-502 (cited in note 5).
81 See note 13 and accompanying text.
82 See, for example, Weitzman, The Marriage Contract 225-333 (cited in note 44)
(arguing for the advantages, in an "intimate" relationship, of a written contract).
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"unconscionability." 3 Some of these doctrines have vague
boundaries, and this unsettled nature only tends to increase
when they are applied to the private ordering of intimate rela-
tionships.84 For example, courts have disagreed about whether
presenting a premarital agreement on the eve of marriage consti-
tutes duress.8 5 In any event, there are such doctrinal rules and
boundaries, and they seem to reflect some judgment regarding
the ability of parties to protect themselves when entering these
sorts of agreements or the courts' unwillingness, as a matter of
public policy, to enforce agreements that appear to be heavily
one-sided.86
A well-known California case, Borelli v Brusseau, 7 indi-
rectly raises other issues relating to the limits of acceptable bar-
gaining. A wife had claimed that her late husband had orally
agreed to leave her certain properties in exchange for her agree-
ment to care for him personally during his illness.88 The alleged
agreement involved giving the wife certain property and
money-arguably comparable to financial rights that the wife
would have had in any case had she not signed a premarital
agreement waiving some of her rights.89 The court refused to en-
force the marital agreement of property for services because, the
court concluded, the contract lacked consideration and contra-
vened public policy-basing both conclusions on the argument
that under California law spouses owe one another an obligation
of care, and the wife thus merely promised to do what she al-
ready had an obligation to do.90
83 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §§ 4.9-4.20, 4.28, 9.2-9.4 at 241-76, 307-16,
619-37 (Aspen 3d ed 1999) (discussing these doctrines).
I On the application of contract law principles to premarital agreements, see Bix, 40
Wm & Mary L Rev at 182-200 (cited in note 78).
85 Compare DeLorean v DeLorean, 511 A2d 1257, 1259 (NJ Super Ch 1986) (finding
that presenting agreement a few hours before the marriage is not duress) with In re Es-
tate of Hollett, 834 A2d 348 (NH 2003) (refusing to enforce an agreement presented less
than forty-eight hours before wedding and signed the morning of the ceremony).
86 See, for example, the discussion in note 78 and the accompanying text, regarding
why "bounded rationality" might justify constraints on the enforceability of premarital
agreements.
87 16 Cal Rptr 2d 16 (1993).
88 Id at 17.
89 Id at 17-18 (mentioning the premarital agreement). As California is a community
property state, absent a premarital agreement, the wife would have an equal partnership
interest during the marriage in wealth acquired during the marriage (other than by gift,
bequest, or inheritance), Cal Fam Code §§ 751, 752, 760, 770 (West 1994 & Supp 2004);
and she would have inherited at least half of that "community property" upon her hus-
band's death. See Cal Prob § 6401 (West 1991 & Supp 2004).
90 The dissenting opinion argued that by promising to care for her husband person-
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Without claiming that the following hypothetical describes
the facts in Borelli, one can imagine a situation where one part-
ner has bargaining leverage at the time of marriage-perhaps
she wants to get married, but he is at best indifferent on the sub-
ject-and on that basis the parties enter a premarital agreement
where one waives some rights in order to persuade the other to
marry. Later, years into the marriage, it might be that the bar-
gaining leverage shifts-perhaps because he wants personal care
or because he wants the marriage to continue more than she
does-and on that basis he transfers certain rights to her in ex-
change for her personal care or for her staying in the marriage.
Both sorts of cases force us to consider what we think about one
partner using his or her bargaining advantage to get something
that the other partner wants (and keeping in mind that some-
thing significant is still being offered in return).91 As discussed in
Part IV, one type of response would be to allow parties leeway to
bargain, even to an extent that might seem somewhat "one-
sided," but to set some limits in terms of minimal fairness or un-
conscionability.
IV. RESPONSES: RANGES OF OPTIONS, REQUIREMENTS OF
INDEPENDENT ADVICE, AND COOLING OFF PERIODS
One response to the difficulties inherent in private ordering
in this area is to allow private ordering, but to put some con-
straints on the private arrangements that will be enforced. This
approach is sometimes described in terms of "menus of op-
ally, the wife was promising more than her statutory obligation, Borelli, 16 Cal Rptr 2d at
22-24 (Poche dissenting), but the majority did not accept this argument.
There is reason to believe that the court actually made its decision because of its
fear that the alleged oral agreement never existed. It is hard otherwise to explain this
statement in the middle of the opinion, not relevant to the argument that came just be-
fore: "There is as much potential for fraud today as ever, and allegations like appellant's
could be made every time any personal care is rendered." Id at 20. The dissent also dis-
cusses the issue of fraud. Id at 23 (Poche dissenting). However, for present purposes, it is
more useful to treat the agreement as actual.
91 A colleague once argued against enforcing such agreements by comparing them to
someone charging a starving man in the desert one thousand dollars for a glass of water.
However, the starving man case is an extreme example of one party's extracting a large
profit due entirely to the other party's circumstances, without any sacrifice on the pro-
vider's part. Premarital and marital contracts are not always like that, even when the
terms appear somewhat one-sided. Marrying when one has doubts about marriage, or
staying in a marriage when one is inclined to leave, can be significant sacrifices, and
should at least sometimes be seen, in the full context of the relationship, as relatively fair
exchanges for whatever rights are given in return.
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tions."92 Parties about to marry would be able to choose among a
variety of marital regimes (different sets of marriage and divorce
rules), with the idea being that a legislature or other governmen-
tal body would have judged each alternative acceptable (as a
matter of fairness or social consequences). 93
The notion of a range of acceptable forms of private ordering,
with state-imposed constraints at the extremes where the ar-
rangements are considered too unfair, is exemplified in one as-
pect of current practice: the limited review of the fairness of
separation agreements. 94 These agreements determine the finan-
cial provisions and custody arrangements for the vast majority of
couples who divorce. Judicial deference in this area implies a
broad range of acceptable settlements for any given marriage,
but some arrangements are considered "out of bounds."95
The rationale for a range of options is to offer a compromise,
allow parties significant choice, and limit the problems that arise
from one-sided agreements. 96 The three states (Louisiana, Ar-
kansas, and Arizona) that offer "covenant marriage,"97 offer a
92 See Bix, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev at 177-79 (cited in note 78).
93 I explore similar ideas in Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal,
36 Fain L Q 255 (2001), where I suggest allowing parties to choose a combination of mar-
riage/divorce laws from those available in any of the states.
94 According to the doctrine in most jurisdictions, the settlement provisions relating
to child custody and child support should receive no deference, while the non-child-related
financial provisions should receive only limited scrutiny forfairness. See, for example,
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 306, 9A Part I Uniform Laws Annotated 248-29
(cited in note 77) (authorizing different levels of scrutiny for provisions of separation
agreements involving property and those relating to children). Practitioners indicate that
in practice most judges given only cursory scrutiny of the agreement, and all the provi-
sions in settlement agreements tend to be "rubber stamped." See Robert H. Mnookin and
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L
J 950, 994-95 (1979) (discussing child support agreements).
95 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 306, 9A Part I Uniform Laws Annotated 248-
49 (cited in note 77) (stating that courts will not enforce provisions that are unconscion-
able).
96 This could be considered similar to what occurs in the Uniform Commercial Code,
where the Code sets default terms, terms that the parties can usually contract around,
but contracting around would then be subject to a back-up unconscionability review. See,
for example, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-309(3); 1A Uniform Laws Annotated 72 (West
1989 & Supp 2003) (mandating that for agreements of indefinite duration, there must be
reasonable notice before termination, and "an agreement dispensing with notification is
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable").
97 Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (West 2000 & Supp 2003); Ark Code Ann §§
9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (Lexis 2002 & Supp 2003); La Rev Stat Ann §§ 9:272-275.1 (West
2000 & Supp 2004).
In covenant marriage, the parties about to marry agree to premarital counseling,
and to restrict their right to divorce, by agreeing to pre-divorce counseling, and to limiting
the grounds on which divorce can be sought (generally, only fault grounds or mutual
consent and an extended period of separation). For a general discussion, see Katherine
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limited variation of such a menu, in the sense that people marry-
ing in that state have a choice between two different sets of
marital rules: conventional marriage and covenant marriage.98
Another response that similarly tries to avoid problems of
unfairness while retaining significant party choice and control
involves the requirement of independent advice for enforceabil-
ity.99 Access to independent counsel might overcome problems of
insufficient information regarding the consequences of choices
and the availability of alternatives. 100 It also offers a source of
advice from someone not subject to the emotional pressures of
the situation.'0 ' Of course, independent advice will not solve all
problems. For example, those strongly inclined to sign an unwise
agreement might still feel so inclined, even after getting good
advice to the contrary.'0 2 California recently enacted legislation
making premarital agreements unenforceable unless the parties
signing it had access to independent legal advice, or expressly
waived the right in writing.10 3 The American Law Institute rec-
ommends a similar requirement. 0 4
Another tool for avoiding unfair agreements without signifi-
cant intrusions on party choice is use of a "cooling off period."10 5
Parties should have time to reflect on agreements without the
pressure of immediate events, or have the right to rescind assent
within a brief time after signing 0 6 This represents the rule for
Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59
La L Rev 63 (1998) (discussing the origins and details of the Louisiana covenant marriage
proposal). While generally an option for couples about to marry, these laws also allow
couples already married to "convert" their marriage to a covenant marriage. See, for
example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 25-902 (West 2000 & Supp 2003).
98 Id.
99 Cal Fam Code § 1615(c)(1) (West 1994 & Supp 2004).
100 Baker, 23 U Mich J L Ref at 234-37 (cited in note 61) (discussing the lack of public
knowledge of the terms of marriage contracts).
101 See Trebilcock and Elliott, Legal Paternalism at 64-67 (cited in note 71) (summa-
rizing the functions of "independent advice" as a correction to contract failure).
102 Id at 66-67.
103 Cal Fam Code § 1615(c)(1) (West 1994 & Supp 2004).
104 American Law Institute, Principles § 7.04(3)(b) (cited in note 2) (listing "both par-
ties [being] advised to obtain independent legal counsel, and [having] reasonable oppor-
tunity to do so, before the agreement's execution" as part of what is necessary for there to
be a rebuttable presumption that a premarital agreement was voluntary).
105 See, for example Minn Stat Ann § 259.24, subd 6a (West 2003 & Supp 2004) ("A
parent's consent to adoption may be withdrawn for any reason within ten working days
after the consent is executed and acknowledged."). Cooling off periods are also familiar in
some consumer protection legislation. See, for example, 15 USC § 1635 (2000) (detailing,
as part of the Truth in Lending Act, the right to rescind within three days of execution
certain loan contracts that involve a mortgage on the consumer's principal residence).
106 Id.
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consent to adoption in many states, such that parties can with-
draw consent within a brief period after signing. 10 7 Comparably,
the American Law Institute recommends a presumption in favor
of the voluntariness of premarital agreements signed at least
thirty days prior to the marriage. 08
V. RESPONSES: REMEDIES AND ALTERNATIVES
In discussions of private orderings, those commentators who
have objections to the enforcement of such arrangements'0 9
should consider the possible consequences of non-enforcement.
As Richard Craswell has pointed out in the related area of one-
sided commercial agreements, the conclusion that certain terms
may be unfair or that the agreement was entered into in a less
than fully voluntary way is only the beginning of the analysis. 110
One must consider the extent to which the refusal to enforce
terms or the judicial rewriting of terms will lead to a better out-
come-both in the case at hand, and in future cases affected by
the general rule."'
First, what will be the effect when private orderings of inti-
mate relationships are not recognized or legally enforced? On
some occasions, people will refuse to enter commitments that will
not have the force of law: some same-sex couples may decide not
to raise a child (if the second parent cannot have his or her pa-
rental rights legally recognized), and some couples may end up
not marrying (if a premarital agreement waiving the rights of
one of the spouses is not enforceable). Whether this result is a
good thing or a bad thing may itself be a matter of contention,
especially for those who contend that children are harmed when
raised by same-sex couples, 112 or for those who believe that a
107 See, for example Minn Stat Ann § 259.24, subd 6a (West 2003 & Supp 2004).
108 American Law Institute, Principles § 7.04(3)(a) (cited in note 2). See Trebilcock and
Elliott, Legal Paternalism at 72 (cited in note 71) (discussing "cooling off' periods).
109 See, for example, Brod, 6 Yale J L & Feminism at 283 (cited in note 5) (arguing for
limited enforcement of premarital agreements).
110 Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U Chi L Rev 1, 35-41 (1993) (discussing alternatives to judicial
enforcement).
Ill Craswell's central argument is that judicial intervention does not solve the basic
problem of parties entering terms on a less than fully voluntary basis. At best, the process
substitutes judge-imposed terms for powerful-party-imposed terms, and this may be a
beneficial alternative in some cases, but it may not be so in every case; it requires analy-
sis and argument to get to that conclusion. See id.
112 See, for example, Paul Cameron and Kirk Cameron, Homosexual Parents, 31 Ado-
lescence 757 (1996).
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marriage on significantly unequal terms is worse than no mar-
riage at all 1 3 (both for those directly concerned 14 and for society
generally).
If the state refuses enforcement of agreements of a certain
kind, as most states once did to divorce-focused premarital
agreements, 115 and as many states now do to co-parenting agree-
ments of same-sex couples, 16 some couples will not make com-
mitments that they otherwise would have made, had states
agreed to enforce the agreements.
At the same time, these people, who would otherwise have
preferred to enter enforceable agreements, might go forward
with their commitments and relationships in any event (if per-
haps less happily).1 7 For example, what might have been a mar-
riage on one-sided terms (had one-sided premarital contracts
been enforceable) would instead be a marriage on more equal
terms.
It is important to recall that for many of these situations, re-
liance on social norms or self-help is not a viable alternative to
public recognition, because of the government's role in ordering
matters elsewhere."18 Thus, the government's failure to recognize
a same-sex co-parenting agreement will often go hand in hand
with enforcing one partner's request that the other partner not
receive visitation or other parental rights regarding the child.1 9
And the failure to give validity to same-sex relationship contracts
113 This position is implied by those who, like Brod, argue for limited enforcement of
premarital agreements. See Brod, 6 Yale J L & Feminism at 283 (cited in note 5).
114 Part of the evaluation here will necessarily turn on how highly one values "auton-
omy" (and on how one defines that term). Some might think it a great harm to refuse to
enforce even quite one-sided agreements, while others might either not consider such
agreements the product of "true autonomy" or might think the cost of autonomy worth the
gain in other values.
115 See Bix, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev at 148-52 (cited in note 78).
116 See Tiffany L. Palmer, Family Matters: Establishing Legal Parental Rights for
Same-Sex Parents and Their Children, 30 Hum Rt 9 (2003) (reviewing state treatment of
co-parenting agreements for same-sex couples).
117 I am indebted to Katharine Silbaugh for the basic point of this paragraph. I discuss
it in somewhat more detail in Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles
of Family Dissolution, 8 Duke J Gender L & Pol 231, 240-41 (2001).
118 See, for example, In the Matter of Alison D v Virginia M, 572 NE2d 27, 28 (NY
1991) (holding that a co-parent did not have standing to seek visitation with child despite
the fact that the co-parents "planned for the conception and birth of the child and agreed
to share jointly all rights and responsibilities of child-rearing"); Curiale v Reagan, 272 Cal
Rptr 520, 521 (Cal App 1990) (holding that co-parent who was not "natural mother, step-
mother, nor adoptive mother" does not have standing to seek custody and visitation with
child).
119 Alison D, 572 NE2d at 28; Curiale, 272 Cal Rptr at 521.
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may affect who has the right (and who has no right) to make
medical decisions for a partner who is not competent to do so,12°
or whether children will receive Social Security survivor bene-
fits.121
Alternatively, the state might choose to give only presump-
tive enforceability to such agreements, refusing agreements
deemed unfair relative to the time that they were entered, or
whose effects would be unfair given subsequent events. If the
standard of unfairness is a matter of judgment, or if enforceabil-
ity turns on subsequent events, then the enforceability of agree-
ments will be uncertain, to a greater or lesser extent, at the time
they are entered. Uncertainty may cause some commitments and
relationships not to be entered (by those who will only enter
them with agreements whose enforceability is certain), but it
may, ironically, encourage others (as one party enters the
agreement because he or she thinks the agreement is enforce-
able, while the other is willing to enter it precisely because he or
she thinks it is not).123
Will the rules affect behavior in the way they are intended to
do? In some circumstances, it seems unlikely. Refusal to enforce
agreements between same-sex couples may discourage some peo-
ple from entering long-term commitments with a partner, but it
is unlikely that it will frequently cause such people to enter op-
posite-sex marriages instead.
A basic question regarding the evaluation of remedies is
whether we think judges can effectively evaluate the issues: the
voluntariness or fairness of intimate agreements, where these
questions necessarily require reference to the particular contexts
and preferences of parties. In the terms of Trebilcock and Elliott
(concerning a related, but narrower set of topics), do we think
that judges are well-placed to distinguish coercion and oppres-
sion from altruism and true self-sacrifice in intimate agree-
120 See, for example, Yvonne Abraham, Gay Couples are Pressing for Equal Benefits,
Boston Globe B4 (Nov 9, 2003) (mentioning the right to make health care decisions for
one's partner as one of the major benefits sought from same-sex marriage or civil union
legislation).
121 See, for example, Maria Newman, Survivor in Gay Union Appeals Denial of Bene-
fits to Boy, NY Times B5 (Oct 15, 2003).
122 The latter is the primary focus on the American Law Institute's approach to pre-
marital agreements. See American Law Institute, Principles § 7.05 (cited in note 2)
("When Enforcement Would Work a Substantial Injustice"); Bix, 8 Duke J Gender L & Pol
at 237-39 (cited in note 117) (discussing § 7.05).
123 For this last point, I am again indebted to Katharine Silbaugh.
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ments?124 If we think judges are poorly placed to make such judg-
ments, bright-line rules may be preferable to making enforceabil-
ity turn on later judgments of fairness or voluntariness. 125
CONCLUSION
Few people are likely to globally favor public ordering or pri-
vate ordering for all of the examples given in this Article. One's
substantive views regarding, for example, the nature, role, and
value of marriage or the morality and/or value of same-sex rela-
tionships and same-sex parenting will strongly influence one's
opinion about these topics.
The basic questions are: (1) what is the role of marriage,
both in society and for individuals?; and (2) what structures in
the institution of marriage are necessary (and which can be al-
tered, at least within a certain range) for marriage to serve its
functions? A related question: is there a proper place for the
state's encouragement of some forms of private ordering over
others? These are questions that turn on difficult moral and po-
litical claims, and, equally importantly, empirical data. As to the
last point, while many of the moral and policy conclusions de-
pend on certain causal claims (for example, that certain family
forms or certain rules will have particular consequences), the
data to support these claims is frequently either non-existent or
sporadic and contested.126
This Article does not deny the importance of these moral,
policy, and empirical debates, but tries to offer an analytical
structure within which such claims can be discussed and evalu-
ated, hoping that a surer analytical footing may clarify the re-
sulting discussions.
124 Trebilcock and Elliott, Legal Paternalism at 68-69 (cited in note 71) (noting the
difficulty of externally distinguishing acts of altruism from coerced acts).
125 Id.
126 See, for example, Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting
on Children, 1997 U Ill L Rev 833, 841-52 (questioning the reliability of the social science
evidence that supports the conclusion that children are not harmed by having homosex-
ual parents).
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